Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate if I

yielded to the majority leader since he was also there and I think

all of us would benefit from his commentary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Sarbanes.

And much of what the majority leader said I would concur

with. I’m extremely pleased that we’re having this hearing, that

this committee has given so much focus to this issue. It’s absolutely

vital that we keep that spotlight on and pressure on in conjunction

with diplomacy, and I hope ultimately some kind of military support

for bringing about security changes. And I want to thank Senator

Brownback for his leadership on the genocide effort that we

had at the end of the August resolution.

I think words, while they’re not the important issue, they do

have real implications with regard to moving the international

community, and I think it gives us greater leverage in negotiating

these U.N. resolutions and hopefully has more meaning even with

the fear that it might strike in the hearts of the governmental officials

and those responsible for these atrocities that I think are so

palpable when you are there.

I must say I’ve never personally witnessed anything as horrifying

as the visit to these camps, and quite frankly, we had access at

ones that were more showcases than what I suspect is going on at

the other 137 camps. I visited two of them, Al Fashir, as you did,

Mr. Secretary, and again, I want to congratulate you for your leadership

on this. The personal involvement, I think, has made a huge

difference and brought great focus to this, but there’s a lot more

to do.

We went to another not-showcased camp, Al Junaynah, and the

difference between one and the other is dramatic, and it only

makes you wonder what number 137 on the list of camps is like

with regard to the suffering of children and the abuse of women

and the general state of conditions of human life. It’s appalling.

And I do think that there has been efforts made, particularly heroic

ones by NGOs and the U.N. with regard to humanitarian aid,

but I think by standards that most folks would accept there’s a lot,

lot more to do, quality of water, quality of sanitation, all of the

issues that surround are just extremely dangerous.

But as you have so ably said, the real issue is security. We’re creating

a huge long-run problem if all we’re going to do is spend a

half a billion dollars a year providing humanitarian aid without

getting to both the security and political situation. And we’re also,

I think, laying the groundwork if we don’t deal with this on both

those conditions, a long-run terrorism trap that could be extraordinarily

dangerous for the world. You put 1.2 million into these

kinds of conditions, they’re not going to be happy over a long period

of time. So expenditures today on other elements to provide for security

and political facilitation and resolution to this problem I

think may be a very wise investment. I hope that we can get to

that mode.

I am particularly gratified to hear you talk about support for this

African Union initiative. I think though this is one of those

places—and I don’t mean this in critical context—action speaks

louder than words on all of our part. One hundred and twenty-five

monitors, when there are 137 or 154 camps, is not a concept that

makes any sense. You talked about the geographical size. We’re

really talking about thousands, and we’re talking about not just

troops, but serious logistical support, helicopters, C–130s, the kinds

of airlift that allows that kind of effort to be effective. It also has

the secondary benefit of helping with some of the distribution

issues that you talked about, retailing the humanitarian aid.

But this needs to happen, and it needs to happen sooner rather

than later in my mind, or we are going to set up a situation where

that bitterness and retribution are going to, I think, reverberate to

a much more serious long-term problem.

I think that this AU issue needs to get quantified, dimensioned,

and action taken on it. That’s why the U.N. resolution is important.

But even without that, I think that we can move along those lines.

The Abuja efforts are also terrific if they are—if people are held to

stay with them. This recess notion is incredibly dangerous because

it allows for further setting in a serious tone the continuation of

what appears to be a transfer of janjaweed into the police force and

militias that are claiming to be providing security. The urgency of

this is real and I appreciate how strongly you have spoken of it.

I guess my specific question is, are we going to get the support

of people who we need to work within the U.N. on so many other

issues? And I presume that that’s China and Pakistan in this particular

instance, with regard to giving us the ability to work with

the AU and have the international community fund this in anything

that approaches a timely fashion, month, 2 months, something

practical in the context of the people who are living their

lives in these camps.

And then the second thing I guess I would ask, are we prepared

to do those things that will provide for the logistical support knowing

we’re not going to send troops, but are we prepared to do those

things that actually make the African Union forces successful? And

if I heard once, I heard twice, five times, that without airlift, there

is no ability to be able to actually deliver on what we’re talking

about. Where do we stand with regard to that?

Have you thought, and do you have a dimension

on what you think that African Union force should look like?

First, I would like to thank our chairman for holding this critical hearing. Having

been in Sudan and visited Darfur last week, I can tell you that this is an urgent

crisis. Just as the U.S. Government must mobilize the international community, we

in the Congress cannot allow our attention to drift. I am pleased that Secretary

Powell is testifying today. I also ask, Mr. Chairman, that we hold another hearing

in the very near future at which private witnesses—including representatives of the

NGO community who have done so much to bring this crisis to the world’s attention—

be permitted to testify.

Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you for your personal involvement in Darfur.

Your visit to Darfur was immensely important. I am also gratified the administration

has decided to call the situation in Darfur ‘‘genocide,’’ and together with the

unanimously passed resolution I sponsored with Senator Brownback and a similar

overwhelmingly passed resolution in the House, I applaud the fact that we are now

speaking with one voice. Now we have obligations under the Genocide Treaty that

must be addressed. I believe there is much more that we should be doing, not just

to alleviate the current humanitarian crisis but to address the currently unresolved

security problem and to bring about an eventual political settlement. This includes

appointing a Special Envoy, to confront head-on the crisis in Darfur and to ensure

that other important issues in Sudan—including the stalled North-South agreement—

receive consistent, high-level attention.

Allow me to make several observations from my visit. First, the humanitarian

workers whom we met and our own USAID team in Sudan are doing remarkable

work under unbelievably difficult circumstances. They deserve our thanks and our

fullest support. Second, if there was one message that came through from our discussions

with IDPs, it is that the security situation has not improved. They are intimidated

within the camps and are afraid to leave them or return to their villages.

I asked one man how long he expected to be displaced from his home. He answered,

‘‘30 years.’’ Third, the camps are growing, not shrinking. Newly arrived IDPs do not

yet have shelter, the food pipeline is delayed, and the humanitarian organizations

are struggling to keep up. And fourth, there is no indication that the Government

of Sudan is willing to even recognize the problem, much less come to a common understanding

of how to resolve it. Foreign Minister Ismail’s recent statement that

only 5,000 people have died in Darfur is outrageous and indicative of the problem.

We must keep the pressure on the Government of Sudan. The UN has concluded

that Khartoum has failed to live up to its obligations under Security Council Resolution

1556. We simply cannot allow this intransigence to stand. We should put maximum

effort behind passing the strongest possible UN Security Council resolution

so that the Government of Sudan is finally held accountable.

As bad as the situation in Darfur is, a real opportunity exists to promote security

through a vastly expanded African Union force. The cease fire monitoring teams,

which I met, are doing critically important work in investigating reported violations.

And their composition—representatives of the Government of Khartoum and the

rebels, AU soldiers, and representatives from Chad and the U.S. or EU—is itself an

important symbolic step. But these teams need support, including air lift, vehicles,

communications and other equipment, and housing. They need help setting up permanent

bases in the six parts of the Darfur they have identified. Their reports

should be taken seriously and made widely available, and their recommendations

should be heeded. And, most of all, their numbers should be dramatically increased.

The numbers of ‘‘protection forces,’’ of which there are currently 300 in Darfur,

should also be expanded. The United States and the international community

should throw its fullest support behind Nigerian President Obasanjo’s call for at

least 3,000 troops. Their mission should be expanded to include protection of civilians.

The Security Council resolution currently being considered should be explicit:

sanctions will be applied if the Sudanese government fails to allow in this expanded

force and accept its broader mandate.

The United States should also provide more assistance to the AU’s mission in

Darfur. Estimates of the costs of an expanded mission with adequate logistical support

are $228 million. Thus far, the administration has requested one tenth this

amount, none of which is new funding. We need to provide supplemental funding

to cover the AU’s mission. With humanitarian costs accounting for $500 million a

year, with a long-term IDP problem creating more hatred and war, we can afford

to provide $50-$100 million in support of an AU force that has the potential to bring

security and create conditions for a political settlement.

The African Union, whose leadership I met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, stands at

a crossroads. Not only for the sake of Darfur, but for the sake of all Africa, we must

increase our assistance to this critical organization. If we merely support an expansion

of the AU’s force in Darfur without providing the necessary assistance, we risk

setting the AU up for failure. This would be tragic. We must contribute more to the

AU, promote it as an institution, encourage its plans to contribute to peace and security

throughout the continent, and appoint an ambassador to the AU. Darfur has

presented a real test, not only for the AU, but also for us. The question remains:

when visionary African leaders step forward to confront Africa’s gravest problems,

will we do everything in our power to help?

Finally, we will not be able to resolve the crisis in Darfur without a real political

solution. The African Union has stepped in to mediate talks between Khartoum and

the rebels. These, and future negotiations, should be supported by the U.S. Otherwise,

we can expect years of violence and suffering, which no amount of humanitarian

assistance can resolve.